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Abstract
This paper oﬀers a reappraisal of the inﬂation-unemployment tradeoﬀ, based on “fric-
tional growth,” describing the interplay between nominal frictions and money growth.
When the money supply grows in the presence of price inertia (due to staggered wage
contracts with time discounting), the price adjustments to each successive change in the
money supply are never able to work themselves out fully. In this context, temporary
nominal rigidities let monetary policy have permanent real eﬀects. Although our theory
contains no money illusion, no permanent nominal rigidities, and no departure from ra-
tional expectations, there is a long-run inﬂation-unemployment tradeoﬀ. Our empirical
analysis suggests that this Phillips curve may be reasonably ﬂat. We show that the per-
sistence of inﬂation and unemployment, in response to monetary policy shocks, is related
to the slope of the long-run Phillips curve.
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This paper proposes a reappraisal of the inﬂation-unemployment tradeoﬀ, based on a phe-
nomenon we call “frictional growth,” concerning the interaction between growth and frictions.
Speciﬁcally, we focus on the interplay between monetary growth and nominal frictions aris-
ing from time-contingent staggered nominal contracts. We show that frictional growth can
nevertheless give rise to a signﬁcant downward-sloping long-run relation between inﬂation and
unemployment - even though our theory contains no money illusion, no permanent nominal
rigidities, and no departure from rational expectations.
Indeed, the calibrations of our theoretical model and the simulation results from our em-
pirical model indicate that the long-run Phillips curve can be quite ﬂat under plausible cir-
cumstances. We also show that the slope of the long-run Phillips curve is related to inﬂation
persistence and unemployment persistence in the aftermath of monetary shocks. In this way,
the long- and medium-run movements of inﬂation and unemployment are closely related.
The intuition underlying our long-run Phillips curve may be summarized as follows. From
the microfoundations of staggered nominal contracts,1 it is well known that, when the time
discount rate is positive, current nominal values are inﬂuenced more strongly by past than
by future nominal values. Consider, for example, two staggered nominal wage contracts, each
lasting a year, with one set in January and the other in July.
• As shown in Figure 1, the current (aggregate) price level Pt (say, for Jan-Jun 2004) is a
markup over the past contract wage Wt−1 (for July 2003 - June 2004) and the current
contract wage Wt (for Jan-Dec 2004).
• In turn, Wt−1 depends on Pt−1 and Pt;a n dWt depends on Pt and Pt+1.
• Consequently, the current price level Pt can be viewed as a weighted average of the past
and future price levels, Pt−1 and Pt. Furthermore, under time discounting, the future
price level receives less weight than the current one.
1Regarding Taylor contracts, see for example Helpman and Leiderman (1990), Ascari (2000), and Graham
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Fig. 1: Intertemporal Relations among Price Levels
In an inﬂationary environment (with all nominal variables growing), this intertemporal
weighting asymmetry has an important implication: the price level chases after a moving target.
The target price is what the price level would be under instantaneous price adjustment. Since
the money supply keeps rising from period to period whereas prices depend more heavily on
past prices than future ones, the price adjustments never work themselves out fully. By the
time the current price level has begun to respond to the current increase in the money supply,
the money supply rises again, prompting a new round of price adjustments.
To analyze the long-run inﬂation-unemployment tradeoﬀ, we need to consider permanent
changes in inﬂation, associated with permanent changes in money growth (such as those ac-
companying changes in a central bank’s inﬂation target or other policy rule). Under the in-
tertemporal weighting asymmetry above, a permanent increase in money growth causes the
price level to fall further behind its target. As illustrated in Figure 2, an increase in money





, but the actual
price level increases less than proportionately (∆Pt ↑ by less).2 Thus, comparing the initial
and ﬁnal steady states, the level of real money balances rises ((M/P)t ↑) and unemployment
falls (ut ↓) while inﬂation rises (πt ↑). In short, the long-run Phillips curve is downward-sloping.
2Speciﬁcally, in any given time period, the price level falls relative to the money supply. But in the steady
state, the money supply and the price level grow at the same rate.
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Fig. 2: Prices Chasing a Moving Target
Underlying this long-run tradeoﬀ is a concept of equilibrium that diﬀers from the textbook
notions. In these standard notions, an economic equilibrium is attained when all lagged adjust-
ment processes have worked themselves out. (This may mean, for instance, that expectations
have become consistent with the underlying stochastic generating processes, or that other tem-
porary adjustment costs - such as production and employment adjustment costs - have been
overcome and thus do not inﬂuence the steady-state behavior of economic agents.) In our
analysis, by contrast, the macro equilibrium is reached when the untrended macro variables
(inﬂation, unemployment) stabilize; but in this equilibrium adjustment costs have not worked
themselves out. On the contrary, the equilibrium is the long-run outcome of a race between
growing variables and lagged adjustment processes. Speciﬁcally, in the context of our analysis,
the money supply is continually growing and wages and prices are continally in the process of
catching up. In the resulting equilibrium, the adjustment processes - the degree of temporary
nominal rigidity (e.g. the length of the contract period) - have a crucial role to play.
Our analysis indicates that the intertemporal weighting asymmetry not only generates a
long-run Phillips curve, but also gives rise to plausible impulse responses to money growth
shocks. A rise in money growth leads to a quick decline in unemployment, but this unemploy-
ment eﬀect dies down with the passage of time (although the eﬀect never disappears entirely).
The inﬂation response is more delayed and gradual. In this way, our analysis is in accord
with the main stylized facts concerning inﬂation persistence: gradual reactions of inﬂation and
unemployment to monetary shocks and the absence of knife-edge inﬂation behavior, viz., if the
4NAIRU is constant, then prolonged swings in unemployment lead to instability in inﬂation.
It is worth emphasizing that, in practice, the intertemporal weighting asymmetry above
depends on more than only time discounting:
• Since future economic conditions are more risky than current ones (i.e. our conﬁdence in
our predictions declines as these predictions lie further in the future), risk-averse agents
discount the future by a risk premium as well as a time discount rate.
• Furthermore, the higher is the expected separation rate of employees, the less likely it
becomes that they will receive the currently negotiated wages that are to accrue in the
future. Thus, when the wage contract is negotiated, employees attach greater weight to
current remuneration (that depends on wages set in the past) than on future remuneration
(that depends on wages set in the future). The average monthly job separation rate in
the U.S. has exceeded 3 percent for much of the past decade.3
• In practice, people often tend to be myopic, and thus act as if they had a high intertem-
poral discount rate.4
For brevity, however, these considerations will remain beyond the scope of our formal model,
which relies only on time discounting to generate the intertemporal weighting asymmetry. We
show that substantial long-run inﬂation-unemployment tradeoﬀs can exist even under reason-
ably low discount rates.
Thus far, downward-sloping long-run Phillips curves have been considered unacceptable on
theoretical grounds. In the absence of money illusion - so the conventional argument goes -
real economic activities do not depend on the unit of account and, by implication, monetary
policy can have no long-term eﬀect on unemployment. Our analysis calls this argument into
question. The absence of money illusion implies that real economic activities are unaﬀected
by a proportional change in all nominal variables (past, present, and future). But under
3Using the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Job Openings and labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS), which begins in
December 2000, Hall (2003) reports that the monthly separation rate was 3.4 percent in December 2000, 3.2 in
December 2001, and 3.0 in December 2002. See also Blanchard and Diamond (1990), who examine household
data in the Current Population Survey as well as the manufacturing turnover survey from 1968 through 1981.
4In the extreme case where the future is ignored, the discount rate is 100 percent.
5circumstances of frictional growth, current nominal variables do not move proportionately to the
money supply. As noted, these variables lag behind their target values (which are proportional
to the money supply), and the faster the money supply grows (ceteris paribus), the further
behind they lag. So the absence of money illusion does not imply money super-neutrality. In
short, under the standard classical principles, in which all demand and supply functions are
homogeneous of degree zero in all nominal variables, it is still possible for monetary shocks to
generate a long-run tradeoﬀ between inﬂation and unemployment.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we relate our analysis to the existing
literature. Section 3 describes the microfoundations of our macro model. Section 4 presents
the corresponding macro model.
Section 5 derives the associated forward-looking short-run Phillips curve, in which current
inﬂation depends on expected future inﬂation and unemployment. Under rational expectations,
expected future inﬂation can be expressed in term of current and past inﬂation and unemploy-
ment. Thus we can derive a closed-form expression for our short-run Phillips curve in which
current inﬂation depends on past inﬂation and unemployment. The resulting Phillips curve
looks remarkably like the traditional backward-looking Keynesian Phillips curve. It thus turns
out that the critical diﬀerence between the forward-looking New Phillips curve and the tradi-
tional backward-looking one does not hinge - as much of the existing literature suggests - on
whether current inﬂation depends on expected future inﬂa t i o no ro np a s ti n ﬂation. Instead,
that it hinges on theoretical parameter restrictions.
In Section 6 we derive the long-run Phillips curve and explain why it may be reasonably
ﬂat in practice. In Section 7 we link the short- and long-run Phillips curves by deriving the
impulse-response functions of inﬂation and unemployment to monetary shocks. We ﬁnd that the
lower is the discount rate, the steeper is the associated long-run Phillips curve (ceteris paribus),
but the longer it takes for unemployment to converge to its long-run values. Empirically, it
may be diﬃcult to distinguish between quick convergence to a ﬂat long-run Phillips curve or
slow convergence to a steep one (i.e. between permanent versus very prolonged unemployment
eﬀects of money growth shocks).
Section 8 provides an illustrative empirical analysis of the U.S. inﬂation-unemployment
6tradeoﬀ, allowing for frictional growth. We show that the resulting impulse-response functions
are broadly in accord with the stylized facts, and the long-run Phillips curve is far from vertical.
Finally, Section 9 concludes with some thoughts on the role of monetary policy in accounting
for the path of inﬂation and unemployment in the U.S. over the 1990s.
2. Relation to the Literature
The traditional Keynesian expectations-augmented Phillips curve, in its simplest form, may be
expressed as πt = πt−1 −γ (ut − un)+εt (where π is the inﬂation rate, u is the unemployment
rate, un is the natural rate of unemployment or NAIRU, γ is a positive constant, and εt is white
noise). It has been called “a fact in search of a theory,” since it is in accord with prominent
empirical regularities, but has proved diﬃcult to rationalize through microfoundations.
The standard textbook version of the New Phillips curve5 (NPC) is πt = Etπt+1−γ (ut − un)+
εt,6 (where Et denotes expectations set at time t). It is far less successful in explaining the
stylized facts. In particular, it has why inﬂation is so persistent, with autocorrelations close to
unity;7 why monetary shocks have delayed and gradual eﬀects on inﬂation and unemployment;8
and why we usually don’t observe “disinﬂationary booms”9. So, with some exaggeration, the
New Phillips curve might be called “a theory in search of a fact”! These issues are important,
since the Phillips curve is central to our understanding of business cycles and widely used in
t h ea n a l y s i so fm o n e t a r yp o l i c y . 10
In recent years various attempts have been made to rectify these predictive deﬁciencies -
5It is also known as the “New Keynesian Phillips Curve” or the “New Neoclassical Synthesis.” For surveys
see, for example, Gali (2002), Goodfriend and King (1997), Mankiw (2001), and Roberts (1995).
6Alternatively, the unemployment term may be replaced by another real variable, such as the output gap.
As discussed below, the microfounded version of the NPC, πt = βEtπt+1 − γ (ut − un)+εt,w h e r eβ is the
discount factor, is generally considered to have quite similar dynamic implications.
7Fuhrer and Moore (1995) argue that although the Taylor model can account for slow adjustment of wages
and prices, inﬂation is a jump variable that can adjust instantly (much like the capital stock adjusts slowly even
though investment can adjust instantly).
8See, for example, Mankiw (2001).
9See Ball (1994). When monetary policy is credible, the announcement of a monetary contraction leads
ﬁrms to expect disinﬂation, and thus they moderate their price rises even before the money supply slows down.
Consequently, real money balances rise, stimulating aggregate demand and reducing unemployment. Conversely,
expansionary monetary policy has a contractionary eﬀect on unemployment. In practice the opposite happens;
for a recent appraisal, see for example Ball (1997, 1999).
10See, for example, Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999).
7generally by bringing the predictions of the NPC more closely into line with the traditional
one - but no consensus on the nature of the Phillips curve has yet been reached.11 Moreover,
both the old and new Phillips curves share a further predictive deﬁciency. It is that if the
NAIRU is reasonably stable through time,t h e ni n ﬂation will change without limit for as long
a st h eu n e m p l o y m e n tr a t ed i ﬀe r sf r o mt h i sN A I R U . 12 This knife-edge prediction has received
little if any empirical support. There is certainly no evidence of limitlessly large deﬂation
when unemployment is high (ut >u n in the traditional Phillips curve) or low (ut <u n in the
NPC). In Europe, the rise in unemployment over much of the 80’s and early 90’s despite stable
inﬂation is not in accord with this interpretation.13 In the US, the fall in both inﬂation and
unemployment during much of the 90’s does not ﬁti te i t h e r .
There are three ways of dealing with the knife-edge problem. One is to assume that the
NAIRU varies through time in agreement with the NAIRU hypothesis.14 Then the NAIRU
hypothesis becomes tautologous, lacking explanatory power. The charge of tautology can be
avoided only if there is convincing ex ante explanatory evidence for the predicted movements
of the NAIRU. But such evidence is often hard to come by. For example, if movements in the
11The literature is vast; the following are a few examples. Mankiw and Reis (2001) address them in a model
where price information disseminates gradually among economic agents. Roberts (1997) constructs a model in
which price expectations are not fully rational. Ball (1995) investigates the eﬀects of monetary policy that is not
fully credible. Gali (2002) and Gali, Gertler, and Lopez-Salido (2001) examine inﬂation persistence in terms of
price staggering and the cyclical behavior of marginal costs. Lindbeck and Snower (1999) examine the real eﬀects
of monetary shocks in the presence of price precommitment and production lags. Huang and Liu (2002) show
that wage staggering is more eﬀective than price staggering in amplifying real persistence of monetary shocks.
Helpman and Leiderman (1990) and Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000) examine the interaction between price-
and wage-staggering. Some authors, e.g. Estrella and Fuhrer (1998) focus on rigidities such as habit formation
in consumption. Other contributors derive real and nominal persistence from complementarities between wage-
price staggering and various real rigidities. For instance, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2001) and Dotsey,
King, and Wolman (1997) examine the interaction between nominal staggering and variable capital utilization.
Jeanne (1998) examines the complementarity between price staggering and real wage rigidity. Bergen and
Feenstra (2000) investigate the real eﬀects of monetary shocks under staggered price setting in the context of
a translog demand structure and roundabout input-output technologies. Kiley (1997) examines the interaction
between price staggering and increasing returns in production. Huang and Liu (2001) analyze price staggering
in a vertical input-output structure.
12Speciﬁcally, the traditional Phillips curve implies that ∆πt = −γ (ut − un)+εt,s ot h a ti n ﬂation falls (rises)
without limit when unemployment is high (low), relative to the NAIRU. By contrast, the New Phillips curve
implies that ∆πt+1 = γ (ut − un)+εt+1 (where εt+1 = πt+1−Etπt+1 is an expectational error), so that inﬂation
rises (falls) without limit when past unemployment is high (low).
13T h er i s eo fE u r o p e a ni n ﬂation and unemployment in the mid-70s and early 80s is not in agreement with
the traditional Phillips curve, with a stable NAIRU.
14In other words, the variations in the NAIRU are such that the resulting diﬀerence between the NAIRU and
the actual unemployment rate is always inversely proportional to variations in the inﬂation rate, according to
the traditional Phillips curve, or directly proportional to the inﬂation variations, according to the New Phillips
curve.
8NAIRU relative to the actual unemployment rate are inversely related to movements in inﬂa-
tion (in accordance with the traditional Phillips curve), then the NAIRU in many continental
European countries must have been rising between the mid-70’s and early 90’s, except for a
f e wy e a r si nt h el a t e1 9 8 0 s .B u ti ti sf a rf r o mc l e a rw h e r et h e s eN A I R Um o v e m e n t sc o u l dh a v e
come from. The large increases in union density, unemployment beneﬁts and beneﬁt durations,
and other welfare state entitlements, the increased stringency of job security legislation, and
the big inﬂux of women and young people into the labor force in Europe occurred primarily in
the 60’s and early 70’s. By the 80’s and 90’s these trends had largely ceased and there were
even important moves in the opposite direction.15 The alleged fall in the U.S. NAIRU in the
second half of the 90’s is also diﬃcult to explain.16 With 20-20 hindsight, it is of course possible
always to identify new constellations of economic variables that could plausibly have pushed
the NAIRU in any direction required by the underlying theory. But the selective nature of this
exercise has made a growing number of economists uneasy.
A second way to avoid the knife-edge problem is to suppose that there are long lags in
the adjustment of unemployment to macroeconomic shocks, such as the oil price shocks of
the mid-70s and early 80s and the interest rate shock of the early 90s. According to this
interpretation, the long-run NAIRU in Europe and the U.S. was reasonably stable over the
past three decades; the divergent unemployment trajectories in Europe and the U.S. are due to
diﬀerences in adjustment costs (such as costs of hiring and ﬁring) in the face of some common
macroeconomic shocks; and these prolonged unemployment adjustments had little inﬂuence on
inﬂation.17 This approach also has diﬃculties: the lagged adjustments need to be very long
and variable for the explanation to work, and it is not clear why inﬂation is not sensitive to
the prolonged unemployment adjustments.
A third way of avoiding the knife-edge problem is to dispense with the NAIRU altogether.
This is the approach is pursued here. Our analysis calls into question the conventional view
15Rising interest rates and tax rates may well have played a role in driving the NAIRU upwards over the
80’s, but the timing of these factors does not always mesh well with the timing of the unemployment increases
in various European countries. The relevant literature is voluminous and well-known; an impressive example is
Phelps (1994, ch. 17).
16This literature is also well-known. See, for example, Phelps (1999) and Phelps and Zoega(2001).
17See, for example, Blanchard and Summers (1986), Lindbeck and Snower (1989, ch. 11), Henry, Karanassou
and Snower (2000).
9that the long-run Phillips curve is either vertical or nearly vertical and that forward-looking
Phillips curves are diﬃcult to reconcile with substantial inﬂation persistence and unemployment
inertia. We show that under plausible empirical assumptions the long-run Phillips curve may
be downward-sloping and reasonably ﬂat, and that the ﬂatter this slope is, the more under-
responsive is inﬂation to a money growth shock.
Our analysis is in some respects similar in spirit to the pathbreaking work of Akerlof, Dickens
and Perry (1996, 2000), who show that the Phillips curve becomes downward-sloping at low
inﬂation rates when there are permanent downward wage rigidities or departures from rational
expectations. But in contrast with these contributions, our analysis indicates that the long-run
Phillips curve is downward-sloping even when there are no permanent nominal rigidities, no
money illusion, and no departures from rational expectations.
Further notable theoretical analyses of non-vertical inﬂation-unemployment tradeoﬀsi n -
clude Hughes-Hallett (2000) and Holden (2003). Holden shows how an inﬂation-unemployment
tradeoﬀ - again at low inﬂation rates - can arise in European countries where the nominal wage
can only be changed by mutual consent in wage negotiations. Hughes-Hallett’s non-vertical
Phillips curve is due to aggregation over sectoral/regional Phillips curves with heterogenous
short-run slopes. Our analysis does not rely on such strategic considerations or aggregation
issues.
It is worth noting that the strictly microfounded version of the NPC is often expressed as
πt = βEtπt+1 − γ (ut − un)+εt,w h e r eβ is the discount factor. Although this Phillips curve
is not subject to the knife-edge problem, the conventional wisdom is that since the discount
factor β is close to unity, it can usefully be approximated by the textbook version above.
On this account, β is commonly set equal to unity when the NPC is used for prediction and
policy analysis,18 and attention in the mainstream literature is focused on explaining inﬂation
persistence rather than avoiding the knife-edge behavior. It is certainly true to say that the
conventional analyses of the Phillips curve are broadly compatible with the NAIRU and its
knife-edge implications.
The existing empirical evidence on the NAIRU hypothesis and the slope of the long-run
18See, for example, Gali and Gertler (1999), Romer (1996), Walsh (1998).
10Phillips curve is distinctly mixed, and has led major contributors such as Mankiw (2001) to be
“agnostic” on the issue. Given economists’ predilection for the classical dichotomy, it is striking
how many well-known recent studies reject it. Ball (1997) shows that countries experiencing
comparatively large and long declines in inﬂation tend also to encounter comparatively large
increases in their NAIRU’s. Ball (1999) suggests that such a relationship may be due to
monetary policy: countries with relatively contractionary monetary policy in the 1980s tended
to have relatively large increases in their NAIRU’s. In Bernanke and Mihov (1998) the estimated
impulse-response functions of unemployment to monetary shocks do not go to zero (although
the estimated inﬂuence is statistically insigniﬁcant). Akerlof, Dickens and Perry (1996, 2000)
ﬁnd evidence of a long-term tradeoﬀ between inﬂation and unemployment at low inﬂation
rates. Dolado, Lopez-Salido and Vega (2000) ﬁnd some evidence of such a tradeoﬀ over the
entire range of observations for Spain during 1964-1995. Fisher and Seater (1993), King and
Watson (1994) and Fair (2000) ﬁnd a long-run inﬂation-unemployment tradeoﬀ as well.
Our analysis will provide theoretical foundation and empirical support for a long-run inﬂation-
unemployment tradeoﬀ. In the process, we will also show that the slope of this tradeoﬀ is closely
related to inﬂation persistence and the dynamic response of unemployment to monetary shocks.
We now present a theoretical model which formalizes our central ideas.
3. Microfoundations
Our microfoundations - in the spirit of Ascari (2003), Huang and Liu (2002) and others - are
quite standard. The model is based on Graham and Snower (2002b).
Consider an economy in which a continuum of households supplies diﬀerentiated labor to a























t is output supplied, nd
t is aggregate employment demanded, nd
t (h) is labour of type h
demanded, and θw is the elasticity of substitution between labour types.
11The households are grouped into N wage-setting cohorts, each of which sets the nominal
contract wage for N periods. Let Wt (h) be the contract wage received by household h.T h e n


























Each household maximizes the present value of its utility over the contract period, which
depends on consumption demand qd
t+i (h), labor supply ns
























where β is the discount factor. This utility function has the desirable long-run properties (see

































where Πt+i (h) is its proﬁti n c o m e ,Rt is the nominal interest factor on its bond holdings Bt (h),
and Tt+i (h) are lump-sum taxes. The household also faces the labor demand constraint (3.2).



























Since there are constant returns to labor in aggregate (yt = nt), the aggregate price level is
a unit markup over the aggregate wage:
Vt = Pt. (3.6)




















Finally, the government has the following budget constraint:
Bt+i+1 + Mt+i+1 = Rt+iBt+i + Mt+i + Tt+i, (3.9)
where B, M, T are the aggregate amounts of bonds, money, net transfers, and Mt =
R 1
h0=0 Mt (h0)h0.
To motivate the inﬂation-unemployment tradeoﬀ as transparently as possible, we now move
from these microfoundations to a linear macro model.
4. The Macro Model
To derive our macro model, we log linearize the equations above (around zero inﬂation)19
and aggregate them across agents. For simplicity, we assume that there are two wage-setting
cohorts.
19The nonlinear behavior of the general equilibrium system above is described in Graham and Snower (2002b).
Due to the linearization here, the predictions of our theoretical macro model are relevant only to low inﬂation
rates. Our empirical analysis below, however, applies to larger variations, since the estimated behavioral
equations are associated with the actual variations in money growth.





(Wt + Wt−1). (4.1)
Log linearizing the consumption function, aggregating across households, and setting the re-
sulting aggregate demand equal to aggregate supply (given by the production function), we
ﬁnd21
Nt = Mt − Pt (4.2)
Substituting the labor demand function and the wage index into the labor supply function
and linearizing, we derive the standard Taylor contract equation:22





is the “discounting parameter”, γ (a positive constant) is the “demand sensitivity parameter”
that describes how strongly the contract wage is inﬂuenced by changes in labor demand, and
c is the “cost-push parameter” representing upward pressure on wages that is independent of
demand. Et denotes expectations formed in period t, and the contract shock ωt is a white
noise error term.23 We assume that the wage setters have knowledge of nominal wages and
employment up to period t.
The aggregate labor supply, deﬁned as the total amount of time available to all households,
is constant, so that it can be normalized to zero: Lt =0 . The unemployment rate (not in logs)
20Pt and Wt are the log-linearized forms of the price level Pt and the contract wage Wt.
21Nt and Mt are the log-linearized forms of aggregate employment nt and the money supply Mt.
22In order to make this contract equation equivalent to the well-known Taylor contract (Taylor (1980a)), we
include an error term, which could be motivated by extending our microfoundations model to include stochastic
preferences or productivity shocks unanticipated by the households.
23We assume that Etωt =0 .
14c a nb ea p p r o x i m a t e da sut = Lt − Nt = −Nt. Thus, by (4.2), the unemployment equation is
ut = −(Mt − Pt). (4.4)
To close the model, we need to specify the process governing the money supply. Since
the analysis of the long-run Phillips curve requires that we consider the unemployment rates
associated with diﬀerent long-run inﬂation rates, we need to consider permanent shocks to
money growth. For simplicity, let money growth follow a random walk:
∆Mt ≡ µt = µt−1 + εt, (4.5)
where Mt is the log of the money supply and εt is a white-noise error term. We assume that
rational agents at time t know the stochastic process generating money growth, and have
i n f o r m a t i o nu pt ot h es h o c kεt, but do not know future realizations of the money growth shock.
It is important to note that our qualitative conclusions do not hinge on this random walk
assumption. Any money growth process involving a permanent change in money growth (e.g.
an I (0) money growth process with a change in money growth regime, or a permanent change
in the monetary authority’s reaction function) would do.24
The macro model above comprises four linear equations in four variables (the price level Pt,
the contract wage Wt,e m p l o y m e n tNt, and the money supply Mt). The supply and demand
sides of the economy are equilibrated through the wage contract equation (4.3): a fall in the
demand for labor puts downward pressure on the nominal wage Wt. The fall in the nominal
wage, in turn, puts downward pressure on the price level (by eq. (4.1)). Thus, given the money
supply (4.5), real money balances rise and aggregate demand is stimulated.
In the context of this model, we now proceed to derive the Phillips curve, ﬁrst in the
short-run and then in the long-run.
24Karanassou, Sala and Snower (2002, Appendix 1) show that although the random walk assumption receives
some moderate support from the data, the central results can be derived from other money growth processes
as well.
155. The Short-Run Phillips Curve
To derive the short-run Phillips curve, we substitute the wage contract equation (4.3) into the
price mark-up equation (4.1) to obtain the following price equation:25







(αNt−1 + αNt +( 1− α)Et−1Nt +( 1− α)EtNt+1), (5.1)
where νt = Et−1Pt − Pt is an expectational error term. Recalling that α = 1
1+β ,t h i se q u a t i o n
implies the following forward-looking short-run Phillips curve:26
πt = βEtπt+1 −
γ
2
[ut−1 +( 1+β)ut + βEtut+1]+γc(1 + β)+ηt, (5.2)
where ηt = βνt +
(1+β)
2 (ωt + ωt−1) −
γβ
2 (Et−1ut − ut) is a random error term. This equation
is quite similar to the standard New Phillips curve (given in Section 2), except that inﬂation
depends not just on current unemployment, but also on past and future unemployment.27
In the mainstream literature, it is common to derive conclusions about inﬂation persistence
and the eﬀects of monetary policy from such an equation alone. For example, the inﬂuential
contribution of Fuhrer and Moore (1995) derives the Phillips curve πt = Etπt+1 + γyt and
then states “All of the persistence in inﬂation derives from the persistence in the driving term
y [excess demand](p. 129)”. This approach is misleading, however, since excess demand y -
or unemployment u in our model - is an endogenous variable which, along with inﬂation π,
is aﬀected by monetary shocks (and other shocks). Thus, inﬂation persistence in response
to monetary shocks can only be examined in the context of a general equilibrium system,
containing both the Phillips curve as well as the relation between the real variable (e.g., y or
25To see this, substitute (4.3) into (4.1) and note that 1
2 (EtWt+1 + Et−1Wt)=1
2 (EtWt+1 + Wt)+
1
2 (Et−1Wt + Wt−1) − 1
2 (Wt + Wt−1)=EtPt+1 + νt.
26Add the term −(1 − α)Pt to both sides of the previous equation and note that, since we normalize the
constant level of the labor force to unity, Nt = −ut.
27It has been argued (e.g. Roberts (1995)) that since unemployment has a high degree of serial correlation, the
weighted average of past, current, and future unemployment may be approximated by the current unemployment
rate. But this argument runs afoul of the Lucas critique: the degree to which current unemployment depends
on past and future unemployment is aﬀected by macro policy (the monetary policy equation (4.5)) and thus
cannot be speciﬁed ap r i o r i .
16u) and the monetary shock.
For this purpose, we need to embed the Phillips curve (5.2) in our general equilibrium system
above, express the expectations of future inﬂation in terms of current and past macroeconomic
variables, and then derive the impulse response functions of inﬂation and unemployment to
money growth shocks. The ﬁrst step is to ﬁnd the equilibrium wage and price level in terms of
current and past variables. It can be shown28 that the equilibrium nominal wage is




































0,a n d0 <λ<1.
The equilibrium price level is














Thus the inﬂation rate is
πt = λπt−1 +( 1− λ)µt +
1
2
(1 − λ)(κ − 1)εt +
1
2
κ(1 − λ)εt−1 +
1
2
(ωt − ωt−2). (5.5)
O b s e r v et h a ti nt h i se q u a t i o nc u r r e n ti n ﬂation (πt) depends on past inﬂation (πt−1), the
money growth rate, and the monetary and real shocks. It is easy to show that the inﬂation
persistence parameter λ depends inversely on the discount factor β (positively on the discount
rate r,w h e r eβ = 1
1+r, the greater the discount rate the greater the persistence parameter
λ). Thus it is clear that the forward-looking Phillips curve (5.2) is compatible with inﬂation
persistence, given the rest of our general equilibrium system. Note that whereas the persistence
parameter λ describes the relation bet w e e nc u r r e n ta n dp a s ti n ﬂation, it does not by itself
provide a description of how fast inﬂation responds to monetary shocks; for the latter purpose,
we also need to consider the stochastic structure of the monetary shocks in the inﬂation equation
(5.5).
28The algebraic manipulations underlying these and subsequent steps in this section are given in Karanassou,
Sala, and Snower (2002), Appendix 2.
17The price equation (5.4) also implies that equilibrium real money balances are













Thus the equilibrium unemployment rate is








κ(1 − λ)εt +
1
2
(ωt + ωt−1). (5.7)
The Phillips curve may be deﬁned as an equation that translates an impulse response
function for inﬂation (5.5) into an impulse response function for unemployment (5.7), and vice
versa. Thus, by equations (5.5), (5.7), and the money supply equation (4.5), we obtain our
short-run Phillips curve in closed form:
πt = d0 + d1πt−1 − d2ut − d3ut−1 + d4ut−2 + et, (5.8)
where









































The above error term is a moving average process in terms of ωt, with parameters which
are non-linear functions of the theoretical parameters ψ, κ, and λ.29 Inspection of equations
(5.9) shows the following relationships among the slope coeﬃcients of (5.8):
d1 = d4, and d3 = d2 − d1. (5.11)
Note that the closed-form Phillips curve (5.8) looks like the traditional backward-looking
Keynesian Phillips curve. Nevertheless, given our macroeconomic model, our closed-form
Phillips curve (5.8) is of course equivalent to our forward-looking Phillips curve (5.2). This is
noteworthy because the standard way of distinguishing the backward-looking from the forward-
29ψ, κ,a n dλ are of course functions of the more basic time-discount parameter α and the demand-sensitivity
parameter γ. Equation (5.8) can also be expressed as
(1 − λB)(1− d1B)πt = d0 (1 − λ) − (1 − λB)
¡
d2 + d3B − d4B2¢
ut + e ωt.
18looking Phillips curves is in terms of lags and leads: in the backward-looking curve, current in-
ﬂation depends on past inﬂation, whereas in the forward-looking curve it depends on expected
future inﬂation. Our analysis suggests that this distinction is bogus. Since expectations of
future inﬂation can be restated in terms of the current and past values of the variables, any
Phillips curve with forward-looking inﬂation expectations can of course be transformed into a
Phillips curve where current inﬂation depends on past inﬂation.
What, then, is the relation between the traditional backward-looking, expectations aug-
mented Keynesian Phillips curve and our forward-looking one? In the traditional Phillips curve,
the coeﬃcients on past inﬂation and on unemployment are unrestricted, with one exception:
since the traditional expectations-augmented Phillips curves is compatible with the NAIRU, the
coeﬃcient on past inﬂation was restricted to d1 =1 . In our forward-looking Phillips curve, as
we have seen, this restriction does not apply.30 Instead, the coeﬃcients of this forward-looking
Phillips curve must satisfy the restrictions (5.11) and its error term (e ωt) follows the moving
average process given by (5.10).31
6. The Long-Run Phillips Curve
In the long-run steady state, πt = πt−1, ut = ut−1, and the white noises error terms εt,a n dωt











γ (1 + β)
µ
LR
t + c. (6.2)
30In this respect, our forward-looking Phillips curve resembles the old-style Phillips curves prior to the “dis-
covery” of the NAIRU. Our long-run Phillips curve is vertical only when the rate of time discount is zero.
31These conditions, however, should not be viewed as restrictions imposed on an estimated Phillips curve
equation, for two related reasons. First, the restricted equation may not be estimable. Second, as we argue
in Section 7, the phenomenon of frictional growth cannot be captured through single-equation estimation of
the inﬂation-unemployment tradeoﬀ, but requires multi-equation estimation, describing how wages and price
depend on the money supply and how unemployment depends on the relation between money and prices (or
some other relation between real and nominal variables).
32Since money growth follows a random walk, the long run money growth rate varies through time (µLR
t has
a time subscript) and the long-run inﬂation rate is time-varying as well.









γ (1 + β)
(1 − β)
c. (6.3)
Note that the slope depends on the discount factor β and the demand sensitivity parameter γ.
The intuition underlying this downward-sloping long-run Phillips curve, given in Section
1, is now easy to conﬁrm. The price level under instantaneous adjustment may be found by
letting the time span of each wage contract tend toward zero, so that α tends to 1/2 and µt to
zero. From the real money balance equation (5.6) we ﬁnd that the resulting “target price level”
(frictionless price) is Pt = Mt +c.33 However, when the money supply grows in the presence of
the intertemporal weighting asymmetry in the wage contract (α>1
2), then the price level lags
behind the moving target price level. Speciﬁcally, by (5.6), the steady state price level becomes
Pt = Mt +c− 2α−1
γ µt. Clearly, a permanent increase in money growth (a rise in µt)c a u s e st h e
price level to fall below the target price, and consequently real money balances (Mt − Pt)r i s e
and unemployment falls.
In the textbook literature on the New Phillips Curve,34 the discount factor is set equal to
unity (β =1 ,s ot h a tα =0 .5 in the contract equation (4.3), i.e. there is no intertemporal
weighting asymmetry), thereby making the long-run Phillips curve vertical and consistent with
the NAIRU hypothesis. The underlying reasoning - that the discount rate is just a few percent
and thus can be approximated by zero - is misleading because (a) the slope of the long-run
Phillips curve depends nonlinearly on the discount factor and (b) the eﬀect of the discount
factor on the slope depends on the value of the demand sensitivity parameter γ.
There is little agreement in the literature about the appropriate value of γ. Taylor (1980b)
estimates it to be between 0.05 and 0.1; Sachs (1980) ﬁn d si ti nt h er a n g e0 . 0 7a n d0 . 1 ;G a l ia n d
Gertler (1999) estimate it to be between 0.007 and 0.047; calibration of microfounded models
(e.g. Huang and Liu (2002)) assigns higher values. Table 1 presents the slope of the long-run
Phillips curve associated with various values of the discount rate r (where β = 1
1+r, α = 1
1+β)
33We evaluate the target price in the absence of the white noise shocks εt and ωt.
34See, for example, Blanchard and Fisher (1989, p. 395). The authors however express discomfort with this:
“Even under lognormality of money and the price level (actually, even under certainty) the optimal rule is not
one in which the parameter is equal to a half” (p. 420).
20and the γ parameter.35
Table 1:Slope of the long-run Phillips curve
slope
r (%) β α γ =0 .01 γ =0 .02 γ =0 .05 γ =0 .07 γ =0 .10
1.0 0.990 0.502 −2.01 −4.02 −10.1 −14.1 −20.1
2.0 0.980 0.505 −1.01 −2.02 −5.05 −7.07 −10.1
3.0 0.971 0.507 −0.68 −1.35 −3.38 −4.74 −6.77
4.0 0.962 0.510 −0.51 −1.02 −2.55 −3.57 −5.10
5.0 0.953 0.512 −0.41 −0.82 −2.05 −2.87 −4.10
Observe that, except for combinations of particularly low discount rates and particularly
high demand sensitivity parameters γ, the slope of the long-run Phillips curve is quite ﬂat.
These results, however, are merely suggestive, since the theoretical model above is obviously
far too simple to provide a reliable account of the long-run inﬂation-unemployment tradeoﬀ
under frictional growth. For that purpose it would be necessary to examine the role of other
growing variables (such as capital and productivity) in conjunction with other frictions (such
as unemployment inertia). The illustrative empirical model in Section 8 is a small step in this
direction.
It can be shown that, for plausible parameter values, our short-run Phillips curve has a ﬂatter
slope and lower intercept than its long-run counterpart.36 F i g u r e s3p r o v i d et w oe x a m p l e so f
associated short- and long-run Phillips curves. Observe that although the long-run Phillips
curve is nearly vertical when the discount rate (deﬁned annually) is very low (at 0.1%) and
much ﬂatter when the discount rate is high (5%), the short-run Phillips curve remains quite
ﬂat in both cases.
35The discount rate applies to a period of analysis which is half the contract span.
36In particular, the slope of the short-run Phillips curve (5.8) is ∂πt
∂ut = d2 = −
γ+γκ
2(2α−1)+γκ whereas the slope






2α−1. It can be shown that if, as is plausible, the long-run
s l o p ei sl e s st h a n−1, the long-run Phillips curve is steeper than the short-run one. (This is a suﬃcient but
not necessary condition, as shown in Karanassou, Sala, and Snower (2002), Appendix 2). The intercept of the






















































Figures 3: The Short- and Long-Run Phillips Curves
(gamma=0.05, c=0.06)
7. Theoretical Impulse Response Functions
We now examine the connection between the short- and long-run Phillips curves by deriving
the impulse response functions of inﬂation and unemployment to a permanent monetary shock,
i.e. a one-oﬀ unit shock to money growth (4.5), occurring at time t =0 : ε0 =1and εt =0for
t>0.A tt i m et =0 , economic agents know the process (4.5) generating money growth, but
not the realizations of the error term εt+i,i≥ 1.
Thus the monetary shock ε0 is known to the wage setters at time t =0 , but not at time
t = −1 (so that the expectations of wage setters at time t = −1 are E−1ε0 =0 ). Since the
current wage W0 depends on the past wage W−1, the current wage W0 does not adjust fully to
the shock ε0. On this account, the shock has real eﬀects.
Let R(πt) and R(ut) be the period-t responses of inﬂation and unemployment (respectively)
to the above money growth shock, ceteris paribus.B yt h ei n ﬂation equation (5.5), we ﬁnd that
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γ (1 + β)
, (long-run response). (7.2)
The impulse-response function for inﬂation always lies above the initial (t =0 )i n ﬂation
rate, and the impulse-response function for unemployment always lies below the inital (t =0 )
unemployment rate. Note that the long-run response of unemployment is simply the inverse of
the slope of the long-run Phillips curve. The equations above indicate that the medium-term
responses of inﬂation and unemployment to the monetary shocks (viz., inﬂation and unemploy-
ment persistence) are closely related to the long-run Phillips curve tradeoﬀ. In particular, the
inﬂation and unemployment responses fall into two broad classes (by the equations above):
1. Inﬂation and unemployment under-shooting: If
(1−β)
γ(1+β) > 1
2 - so that the absolute value
of the slope of the long-run Phillips curve is less than 2 - then inﬂation gradually rises
toward its new long-run equilibrium (πt <π LR, and πt+1 >π t for t ≥ 0); unemployment
gradually falls towards its new long-run equilibrium (|ut| < |uLR| for t ≥ 0).




that the absolute value of the slope of the long-run Phillips curve exceeds 2 - then inﬂation
rises, over-shooting its new long-run equilibrium after one period, and then gradually falls
toward this equilibrium (π0 <π LR,π t >π LR, and πt+1 <π t for t ≥ 1). Unemployment
falls, over-shooting its new long-run equilibrium, and then gradually rises toward this
equilibrium (|ut| > |uLR|, and |ut+1| < |ut| for t ≥ 0). The maximum impact of the
monetary shock on unemployment is achieved before the maximum impact on inﬂation.
23For most of the empirically reasonable parameter values given in Table 1, the impulse-
response functions can be shown to fall into Class 2, the class that accords with the stylized facts
(viz., the inﬂation responses to monetary shocks are delayed and gradual, the unemployment
responses occur more quickly). Figures 4 depict the impulse response functions for inﬂation,
unemployment, and the slope of the Phillips curve for the same parameter values as in Figures
3.37 The horizontal axis measures time; the left-hand vertical axis measures the slope of the
Phillips curve; and the right-hand vertical axis measures the inﬂation and unemployment rates.
Observe when the discount rate is very low (r =0 .1%), in Fig. 4a, the long-run Phillips
curve is virtually vertical, but the short-run Phillips curve at time t =0is very ﬂat, and it
takes a very long time for unemployment, inﬂation, and the Phillips curve slope to reach their
long-run values.
By contrast, when the discount rate is higher (r =5 % ), the long-run Phillips curve is quite

















































































































































































The shock is a 1 %  point increase in the money growth rate at t=0
Figures 4: Impulse Response Functions
(gamma=0.05)
It is easy to show that this pattern holds for the full range of discount rates: The lower the
discount rate (for a given value of the demand-sensitivity parameter γ):
37The value of c has no eﬀect on the slope of the Phillips curve.
24• the steeper is the long-run Phillips curve and
• the longer it takes for the slope of the Phillips curve to converge to its long-run value.
Thus, observationally, it may make little diﬀerence whether the long-run Phillips curve is
ﬂat - so that an increase in money growth permanently reduces unemployment - or near-vertical
- so that the eﬀect is not permanent, but very prolonged. In other words, it may be diﬃcult, if
not impossible, in practice to distinguish between a world in which there is quick convergence
to a ﬂat long-run Phillips curve and one in which there is slow convergence to a steep one. In
both cases, money growth shocks have long-lasting eﬀects on unemployment.38
8. Empirical Analysis
Our empirical analysis is based on multi-equation estimation, since the phenomenon of frictional
growth cannot be captured through the usual procedure of estimating a single-equation Phillips
curve. When we estimate a traditional or New Phillips curve as a single equation, we are unable
to assess how the eﬀects of money growth work their way through the wage-price adjustment
process and thereby aﬀect unemployment. Money growth does not enter a single-equation
Phillips curve at all; it is substituted out when the impulse-response function of inﬂation is
substituted into the impulse-response function for unemployment to derive the Phillips curve.
On this account, we estimate a dynamic structural model, with the following building blocks,
matching those of our theoretical model: a wage setting equation and a price setting equation,
to portray nominal sluggishness (so that changes in money growth lead to changes in real money
balances), and the unemployment equation indicates how the changes in real money balances
aﬀect the unemployment rate.
38In this context it is also easy to show that we can avoid the counterfactual implication of disinﬂationary
booms, analogously to Mankiw and Reis (2001). In the context of the Calvo model of random nominal adjust-
ment, Mankiw and Reis avoid disinﬂationary booms by assuming that only a fraction of agents receives updated
information in each period. The analogue in the Taylor model of ﬁxed, staggered adjustment is to assume that
all agents receive information about monetary shocks with a one-period lag. It is trivial to see that if monetary
shocks are announced one period in advance and if agents’ information about these shocks is received one period
in arrears, then the resulting model generates precisely the same results as the model above. More generally,
our model avoids the implication of disinﬂationary booms whenever the lead time for monetary announcements
is not greater than the lag time in agents’ information updates.
25In most of the current empirical literature, by contrast, the Phillips curve is estimated
in a single-equation framework.39 It is customary to use the lead of inﬂation as a proxy for
expected future inﬂation. Thus the NPC can be consistently estimated by generalized method
of moments (GMM) or, since the model is linear in the parameters, two stage least squares
(TSLS). Bardsen, Jansen and Nymoen (2002), show that the empirical results are sensitive to
the choice and exact implementation of the estimation method. Overall, there is no agreement
in the recent literature about the appropriate method of estimating the NPC and how to test it
against the traditional Phillips curve. Consequently, there is disagreement about whether the
empirical evidence favors the traditional or New Phillips curves.
T h ec h o i c eo ft h ef o r c i n gv a r i a b l ei sc r u c i a lw h e ne s t i m a t i n gt h ei n ﬂation dynamics asso-
ciated with the Phillips curve. Gali and Gertler (1999), Gali, Gertler and Lopez (2001) ﬁnd
evidence in support of the NPC only when they use labor income share as the forcing variable.
Rudd and Whelan (2001) propose using a present value term of the forcing variable in the
inﬂation regression and report results that are consistent with a backward-looking (traditional)
Phillips curve.40
The choice of instruments can have a strong inﬂuence on the GMM estimates of the NPC and
their signiﬁcance. It is widely accepted that the test for overidentifying restrictions as a means to
detect invalid instruments has low power. In addition, Bardsen, Jansen and Nymoen (2002), and
Rudd and Whelan (2001) argue that the results can be signiﬁcantly biased by using variables
as instruments that actually belong in a well-speciﬁed inﬂation regression. Furthermore, if the
forcing variable is regarded as endogenous then it should be instrumented in the estimation.
Bardsen, Jansen and Nymoen (2002) argue that to derive the dynamic properties of inﬂation,
39The NPC is simply expressed as
πt = βEtπt+1 + γxt,
where β is the discount factor, and the ”forcing variable” xt is a measure of excess demand (unemployment
rate, output gap) or a measure of real marginal costs (like the wage share).







The last term in the above equation is a present value term of the forcing variable and γ is estimated using
GMM.
26we require an analysis of the system that includes the forcing variable as well as the rate
of inﬂation, and conclude that “as statistical models, both the pure and hybrid NPC41 are
inadequate”.
In this context, it is important to keep in mind our theoretical argument (Section 4) that
any forward-looking Phillips curve (containing leads) can be translated into a backward-looking
one (containing only contemporaneous and lagged variables) by solving the macro model and
expressing expectations of future inﬂation in terms of present and lagged variables. On this
account, as well as the unresolved empirical issues above, the wage and price equations in our
empirical model are speciﬁed solely in terms of current and past variables. (They can, however,
be interpreted as the outcome of decisions by forward-looking agents, because these agents’
expectations of the future depend on their information about current and past variables and
the underlying stochastic processes.) Thus, the empirical wage and price equations may be
seen at the counterparts of equations (5.3) and (5.4), respectively.42
We solve these three equations as a system and derive the implied inﬂation-unemployment
tradeoﬀ. This empirical exercise merely aims to illustrate how an estimated Phillips curve
can be derived from equations describing the interplay between money growth and nominal
frictions. The exercise is no more than a preliminary ﬁrst step towards a full-blown empirical
investigation,43 which lies well beyond the scope of this paper.
41This point is consistent with our argument in Section 4 that inﬂation persistence in response to monetary
shocks can only be evaluated in the context of a general equilibrium system including the Phillips curve, rather
than through the Phillips curve alone.




42More precisely, the empircal model may be understood as a natural extension of our theoretical model to
include staggered contracts of both wage and prices. Thus in our empirical model, past nominal values aﬀect
the current wage level diﬀerently from the current price level.
43Such an analysis would, for example, contain a wider range of explanatory variables (e.g. dividing the
labor force into skilled and unskilled workers, distinguishing between productivity in diﬀerent sectors of the
economy, etc.), a larger number of equations (e.g. the unemployment rate could be derived from labor demand
and labor supply equations, the capital stock could be endogenized, etc.), and so on. It would also examine the
implications of GMM and 2SLS estimation of wage and price equations containing leads.
278.1. Data and Estimation
We use US annual time series data, obtained from the OECD and Datastream, covering the
period 1966-2000. The deﬁnitions of the variables are given in Table 2.
Table 2: Deﬁnitions of variables





Pt : price level ot : real oil price
Wt : nominal wages fdt : real foreign demand (exports-imports)
ut : unemployment rate τt : i n d i r e c tt a x e sa sa%o fG D P
prt : real labor productivity bt : real social security beneﬁts
mt : real money balances(Mt − Pt) ssct : real social security contributions
kt : real capital stock
All variables are in logs except for ut, foreign demand, fdt, a n dt h et a xr a t e ,τt.
The variables mt,ssc t,b t, and fdt have been normalized by working age population.
The ﬁnancial wealth variable fwt is deﬁned as in Phelps and Zoega (2001).
The price setting, wage setting, and unemployment rate equations of our model were initially
estimated individually using the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) approach to cointegra-
tion analysis developed by Pesaran and Shin (1995), Pesaran (1997), and Pesaran et al. (1996).
These papers argue that the traditional ARDL approach justiﬁed when regressors are I(0), can
also be valid with I(1) regressors. An important implication of this methodology is that, since
an ARDL equation can always be reparameterized in an error correction format, the long-run
solution of the ARDL can be interpreted as the cointegrating vector of the variables involved.
The dynamic speciﬁcation of each equation was determined by the optimal lag-length al-
gorithm of the Akaike and Schwarz information criteria. The selected estimated equations
are dynamically stable (i.e., the roots of their autoregressive polynomia lie outside the unit
circle), and pass the standard diagnostic tests (for no serial correlation, linearity, normality,
homoskedasticity, and constancy of the parameters of interest) at conventional signiﬁcance lev-
els.44 In order to take into account potential endogeneity and cross equation correlation, we
then estimated the equations as a system using three stages least squares (3SLS). These results
are presented in Table 3.45 The model tracks the data very well.46
44See Karanassou, Sala and Snower (2002), Appendix 3.
45Constants and trends are omitted for brevity.
46The actual and ﬁtted values of the estimated system are pictured in Karanassou, Sala and Snower (2002),
Appendix 4.
28Table 3: US model, 3SLS, 1966-2000.
Dependent variable: ut Dependend variable: Pt Dependend variable: Wt
coef. std. e. coef. std. e. coef. std. e.
ut−1 0.43 (0.12) Pt−1 1.19 (0.13) Wt−1 0.24 (0.10)
ut−2 −0.30 (0.11) Pt−2 −0.54 (0.08) ∆Wt−2 0.48 (0.10)
mt −0.12 (0.03) Wt−1 0.34 (0.10) Pt 0.68 (0.09)
fdt −0.16 (0.05) Mt 0.01 (∗) Mt 0.09 (∗)
∆kt −0.01 (0.002) ut −0.72 (0.16) ut −0.41 (0.17)
ot−1 0.01 (0.003) prt −0.30 (0.06) prt 0.32 (0.09)
fwt −0.01 (0.005) ot 0.02 (0.004) bt 0.05 (0.02)
ssct 0.04 (0.02) ot−1 0.01 (0.004)
ot−2 −0.01 (0.003)
τt 0.02 (0.006)
(∗) coeﬃcient is restricted so that there is no money illusion.
∆ denotes the diﬀerence operator.
In the unemployment equation, product demand-side inﬂuences are captured through real
money balances and ﬁnancial wealth47 (aﬀecting domestic demand), as well as net foreign de-
mand. Product supply-side inﬂuences are captured through the oil price, capital accumulation,
and social security contributions. Observe that the sum of the lagged dependent variable coef-
ﬁcients is small and positive, implying a low degree of unemployment persistence. Since the US
unemployment rate is trendless, the explanatory variables in the unemployment equation need
to be speciﬁed as non-trended series as well. On this account, real money balances, social secu-
rity contributions and beneﬁts, and foreign demand are normalized by working age population,
whereas ﬁnancial wealth is deﬂated by productivity.
The price and wage equations are quite standard.48 Prices depend on wages and the money
supply, and wages depend on prices and the money supply. Productivity has a positive eﬀect
on nominal wages and a negative eﬀect on prices. The unemployment moderates the mark-up
of prices on wages, and of wages on prices. The lag structure of our price and wage equations is
consistent with our theoretical model.49 The restriction of no money illusion is imposed on the
47See Phelps (1999), Fitoussi et al. (2000), and Phelps and Zoega (2001).
48In order for all variables in our price and wage equations to be integrated of the same order, the equa-
tions need to be reparameterized before estimation. For instance, consider the price equation in Table 3:
Pt = a0 + a1Pt−1 + a2Pt−2 + a3Wt−1 +( 1− a1 − a2 − a3)Mt + β
0xt,where β
0 is a row vector of parame-
ters, and xt is a column vector of the real variables. The above can be reparameterized as (Pt − Mt)=
a0 +a1 (Pt−1 − Mt−1)+a2 (Pt−2 − Mt−2)+a3 (Wt−1 − Mt−1)−(a1 + a2 + a3)∆Mt −a2∆Mt−1 +β
0xt. These
two equations are statistically equivalent. We estimate our price equation using the latter equation, and present
the Table 3 results in the format of the former equation. The analogous procedure is applied to the wage
equation.
49In both the theoretical and empirical models, current wages and prices are explained in terms of past wages
and prices and the current money supply. The empircal model may be understood as a natural extension of our
29price and wage equations, so that each equation is homogeneous of degree zero in all nominal
variables. Speciﬁcally, we restrict the coeﬃcient of money in each of our nominal equations to
be equal to one minus the coeﬃcients of all nominal variables on the right-hand side of that
equation.50 These restrictions could not be rejected at conventional signiﬁcance levels.
8.2. Empirical Impulse-Response Functions
In this empirical context, we examine the inﬂuence of a money growth shock on inﬂation and
unemployment through time. Speciﬁcally, suppose that the economy is initially in a steady
state, with the money supply growing at the constant rate µ. Then, at time t =0 ,t h e
money growth rate increases by a ﬁxed amount to µ0. This shock is unanticipated and may be
interpretted as a single realization of the stochastic process generating the money supply.51 We
derive the inﬂation and unemployment responses to this shock for time t ≥ 0.52
Figure 5 presents the impulse response functions (IRFs) that correspond to a 10% permanent
increase in the growth rate of money supply. The inﬂa t i o nI R Fh a sa l lt h ed e s i r a b l ep r o p e r t i e s ,
namely, the inﬂuence of the monetary shock on inﬂation is delayed and gradual, and in the
long run inﬂation is equal to money growth. The unemployment IRF also exhibits plausible
behavior: the unemployment eﬀect of the monetary shock is also delayed and gradual, but this
eﬀect occurs sooner than the inﬂation eﬀect (e.g. the maximum unemployment eﬀect occurs
well before that on inﬂation.) Also observe that the inﬂation and unemployment responses take
al o n gt i m et oc o n v e r g et ot h e i rl o n g - r u nv a l u e s .
The only strikingly unconventional property of the unemployment IRF is that the unem-
ployment eﬀect does not die down to zero; rather, a 10 percent increase in money growth leads
to a 2.73 percent fall in long-run unemployment.53 Thus, the slope of the long-run Phillips
theoretical model to include staggered contracts of both wage and prices. Thus in our empirical model, past
nominal values aﬀect the current wage level diﬀerently from the current price level.
50For example, the price equation in Table 3 (ﬁrst equation in the previous footnote) is clearly homogeneous
of degree zero in Mt, Pt, Pt−1, Pt−2,a n dWt−1. The analogous restriction is imposed on the wage equation.
51Since the shock is a realization of the actual money growth process, this exercise does not run afoul of the
Lucas critique.
52We assume that the future values of the exogenous variables are unaﬀected by the monetary shock (which
is obvious, for otherwise these variables would not be exogenous). Thus, given the linearity of our model, the
simulation is unaﬀected by these future variables.
53Also observe that the unemployment IRF overshoots substantially: the maximum eﬀect on unemployment
is nearly 4 percent.
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Figure 5. Impulse-response functions to a 10%









































To have conﬁdence that our long-run Phillips curve is indeed not vertical, we need to examine
whether our point estimate of the slope (-3.66) is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from inﬁnity. For this
purpose, we perform the following Monte Carlo experiment, consisting of 1000 replications.












, t =1 ,2,...,T (of the
unemployment rate, price, and nominal wage equations, respectively) is drawn from the normal
distribution,54 N(0,
P
).T h ev e c t o rε
(i)
t is then added to the vector of estimated equations to












. Next, the equations
of the model are estimated using the new vector of endogenous variables y
(i)
t ,a n dt h es e to f
exogenous variables. Finally, the simulation exercise of the previous section is conducted on
the newly estimated system to derive a new estimate of the slope of the long-run Phillips curve.
In this way, each replication (i) yields a new value for the slope: S(i),i=1 ,2,...,1000.
Figure 6 presents the histogram of the 1000 simulated values of the long-run Phillips curve
slope. This shows clearly that the estimated slope of the long-run Phillips curve is indeed
signiﬁcantly downward-sloping and reasonably ﬂat, rather than vertical.55
54We used the normal distribution because the assumption of normality is valid in the estimated system of
equations. (εt ∼ N (0,
P
),w h e r e
P
is the variance-covariance matrix of the estimated model.)















This paper oﬀers a reappraisal of the inﬂation-unemployment tradeoﬀ on the basis of frictional
growth. While the choice between our analysis and the textbook New Phillips curve is an em-
pirical issue, three of our results suggest that our approach is more closely in accord with the
established empirical regularities. First, in our analysis movements of inﬂation and unemploy-
ment do not have the knife-edge property; in fact the long-run Phillips curve may be reasonably
ﬂat. The available empirical evidence in the OECD does not support the view that inﬂation
falls without limit when unemployment is above some stable NAIRU (implying a vertical long-
run Phillips curve); nor does it appear to support the view that there is massive deﬂation when
unemployment is high (implying that the long-run Phillips curve is very steep). Second, our
analysis can explain how money growth shocks have a delayed and gradual eﬀect on inﬂation,
so that there is inﬂation persistence. Third, it shows that monetary shocks usually have a
quicker eﬀect on unemployment and the time path of this eﬀect tends to be hump-shaped.
Inevitably, our analysis suggests a reevaluation of the role monetary policy in the macroeco-
nomic system. It shows that since the eﬀects of monetary policy on inﬂation and unemployment
generally take a long time to work themselves out, we cannot expect close correlations between
32current money growth (on the one hand) and current inﬂation and unemployment (on the
other), even though monetary policy may have a major inﬂuence on these variables over time.
Signiﬁcantly, our analysis indicates that monetary policy can have long-term eﬀects on unem-
ployment. Whether these eﬀects are permanent (along a downward-sloping long-run Phillips
curve) or very prolonged (slow adjustment to a near-vertical long-run Phillips curve), may
make little observational diﬀerence. Indeed, our theoretical model indicates that, in response
to variations in the real interest rate, steeper long-run Phillips curves are associated with slower
adjustment.
These considerations can have far-reaching implications for our understanding of monetary
policy eﬀectiveness. To illustrate brieﬂy, consider the puzzling U.S. macroeconomic develop-
ments of the 1990s, when the unemployment rate declined (after 1992) and inﬂation remained
subdued even though the rate of money growth surged. Although our empirical model is merely
illustrative of our approach and should not be viewed as a serious tool for evaluating monetary
policy, it nevertheless points to a simple story consistent with the facts. Figure 7a depicts the
time path of the actual unemployment rate against the one the unemployment rate would have
followed, in our model, had money growth remained constant at its 1993 rate. The diﬀerence
between these two time paths represents the unemployment eﬀect that is attributable to money
growth, as an accounting exercise.56 Figure 7b illustrates the actual inﬂation rate against the
simulated inﬂation rate under money growth ﬁxed at its 1993 rate, so that the diﬀerence rep-
resents the inﬂation eﬀect attributable to money growth. Finally, Figure 7c depicts the actual
inﬂation rate against the simulated inﬂation rate under productivity growth ﬁxed at its 1993
rate, so that the diﬀerence represents the inﬂation eﬀect attributable to productivity growth.
56The money growth rate was less than 2 percent per annum in 1993, rose steadily to over 8 percent in
1998, before declining beneath 6 percent in 2000. Increased productivity growth is also associated with reduced
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at its 1993 rate)
Although these ﬁgures are merely suggestive - even in our illustrative model, inﬂation and
unemployment are explained by a lot more than just money growth and productivity growth
- they make three simple points: First, the surge of money growth over the second half of the
1990s can account for about two thirds of the decline in unemployment over this period (Fig.
7a). Second, the money growth surge was of course associated with a rise in inﬂation (Fig. 7b).
But, third, this inﬂationary inﬂuence was substantially undone by the fall in inﬂation associated
with the increase in productivity growth over the period (Fig. 7c). This is of course a highly
selective, impressionistic account of what happened, but it highlights some signiﬁcant features
of our analysis. In particular, since it can take a long time for the long-run inﬂation eﬀect of a
monetary growth shock to manifest itself, a surge in money growth need not be accompanied
promptly by a surge in inﬂation. Inﬂation does not rise indeﬁnitely when unemployment is low.
Finally, monetary policy can have a long-term inﬂuence on unemployment and, over a period
of half a decade or more, it is hard to tell whether this inﬂuence is permanent or prolonged,
since the unemployment trajectory reﬂects the cumulative inﬂuence of lengthy impulse-response
functions from an ongoing stream of monetary shocks. In any case, monetary policy may play
a more important and durable role in the real economy, and with respect to unemployment in
particular, than the mainstream theories allow for.
O u ra n a l y s i si so fc o u r s ej u s taﬁrst step towards a thorough reevaluation of the inﬂation-
unemployment tradeoﬀ in terms of frictional growth. Much remains to be done, both in explor-
ing the microfoundations of time-contingent price adjustment and in building reliable empirical
models of how monetary shocks aﬀect real economic activity.
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38APPENDICES
Appendix 1a: Time-Series Properties of the Money
Supply
The following table presents the results of unit root tests on the US money supply. Observe
that we cannot reject the hypothesis that the growth rate of money supply follows an I(1)
process at the 5% size of the test.
Table A1: Unit root tests, US money supply, 1966-2000
Dickey-Fuller Phillips-Perron 5% critical value
Mt ADF(c,t) = −0.77 PP(c,t) = −0.35 −3.54
∆Mt ADF(c) = −2.80 PP(c) = −2.72 −2.95
∆2Mt ADF= −7.40 PP= −7.55 −1.95
ADF(c,t), and PP(c,t) denote the unit root tests with constant and trend.
The lag truncation for Bartlett kernel in the PP tests is three.
The order of augmentation in the ADF tests is one.
Appendix 1b: Alternative Speciﬁcation of the Money
Supply Process
Suppose that money growth µt follows a stationary autoregressive process and the monetary
authority pursues the following mixed strategy: with probability ρ it follows
µt = g + ψ1µt−1 + εt, (9.1)
and with probability (1 − ρ) it follows
µt = g + ψ2µt−1 + εt, (9.2)
where εt is white noise, 0 <ψ 1,ψ2 < 1,a n dψ1 <ψ 2.
Thus the money supply rule is
µt = g + ξµt−1 + εt, (9.3)
where ξ = ρψ1 +( 1− ρ)ψ2.
Consequently the equilibrium nominal wage is given by57
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The price equation is





























The real money balances equation is given by




















The unemployment rate equation is
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where the long-run inﬂation rate is πLR
t = g/(1 − ξ). Changes in the policy parameters ρ, ψ1,
and ψ2 move the economy along this long-run Phillips curve by changing the parameter ξ.
Appendix 2: Theoretical Model and Results
Our model may be summarized as follows:
58κ,λ1,λ 2 are given in Appendix 2.
2Nt = Mt − Pt, (9.11)
Lt =0 , (9.12)
ut = Lt − Nt = −(Mt − Pt), (9.13)




(Wt + Wt−1), (9.15)
Wt = αWt−1 +( 1− α)EtWt+1 + γ [c + αNt +( 1− α)EtNt+1]+ωt, (9.16)
2.1: Wage Equation
Substitute (9.11) and (9.15) into (9.16) to get:
















Apply the expectations operator Et on the above equation, recall that Etωt =0 , collect terms
together, so that






















To obtain the rational expectations solution of the above eq. (9.18), we proceed as follows.
Use the backward shift operator B59 to rewrite (9.18); then multiply both sides of the resulting
















EtAt = γ [αEtMt +( 1− α)EtMt+1]. (9.21)











=( 1− λ1B)(1− λ2B), (9.22)
59Note that B1 shifts the variable backward, where B−1 shifts the variable forward, i.e.
B [EtWt]=EtWt−1, and B−1 [EtWt]=EtWt+1,
where Et is in all cases the conditional expectation as of period t.
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.
It can be shown that one root lies inside the unit circle and the other outside the unit circle.
In particular, we can show that when 0 <γ<2 then 0 <λ 1 < 1 and λ2 > 1.
We can rewrite (9.20) using (9.22) as
(1 − λ1B)EtWt =
γc
φ3 (λ2 − 1)
−
B (EtAt)
φ3 (1 − λ2B)
. (9.24)








Substitute the above into (9.24) to get:
(1 − λ1B)EtWt =
γc





















or, using (9.21) and (9.14),
(1 − λ1B)EtWt =
γc













Further algebraic manipulation leads to
(1 − λ1B)EtWt =
γc
























α(1 + λ1)(1− α)
α − λ1 (1 − α)
. (9.27)
(It can be shown that κ>0.)S ow eh a v e
(1 − λ1B)EtWt =( 1− λ1)c +( 1− λ1)Mt + κ(1 − λ1)µt.
A comparison of the above eq. with (9.16) indicates that the rational expectations reduced-
form stochastic diﬀerence equation for the wage is62
Wt =( 1− λ1)c + λ1Wt−1 +( 1− λ1)Mt + κ(1 − λ1)µt + ωt. (9.28)
Note that the above is the wage equation given in the text. (In the text the stable root λ1 is
denoted by λ for simplicity.)
2.2: Price Equation
To derive the equation for the price dynamics rewrite the price equation (9.15) as follows:
(1 − λ1B)Pt =
1
2




and substitute into it the wage equation (9.28). In the resulting equation, substitute the
following expressions (implied by the money supply process (9.14)):
Mt−1 = Mt − µt, and µt−1 = µt − εt.
Next, collect terms together to get the price equation given in the text:63










κ(1 − λ1)εt +
1
2
(ωt + ωt−1). (9.29)
2.3: Inﬂation Rate Equation
61Note that





φ3 (λ2 − 1)
=( 1− λ1).
62For the solution of linear diﬀerence equations under rational expectations see also Blanchard and Kahn




5Let the inﬂation rate be πt ≡ ∆Pt, and take the ﬁrst diﬀerence of the price dynamics eq.
(9.29) to obtain the inﬂation dynamics equation:
(1 − λ1B)πt =( 1− λ1)µt +
1
2




κ(1 − λ1)εt−1 +
1
2
(ωt − ωt−2). (9.30)
2.4: Real Money Balances, and Unemployment
To obtain the real money balances equation we do the following. Add and subtract on the
R.H.S. of the price equation (9.29) the term λ1Mt−1, and then rearrange terms so that

























Thus we obtain the real money balances equation given in the text:













Rewrite the unemployment equation (9.13) as
(1 − λ1B)ut = −(1 − λ1B)(Mt − Pt).
To obtain the dynamics for aggregate demand, substitute into the above equation the real
money balances equation (9.33):













2.5: Short-Run Phillips Curve
Rewrite the unemployment eq. (9.34) and inﬂation eq. (9.30) as
(1 − λ1B)ut =( 1− λ1)c − β1µt − β2εt +
1
2
(ωt + ωt−1), (9.35)
(1 − λ1B)πt = δ1µt + δ2εt + β2εt−1 +
1
2
(ωt − ωt−2), (9.36)
6where









δ1 =1− λ1,δ 2 =
1
2
(1 − λ1)(κ − 1).
Now substitute the money supply eq. (9.14): (1 − B)µt = εt into (9.35) and (9.36) to get
(1 − λ1B)ut =( 1− λ1)c − β1µt − β2 (1 − B)µt +
1
2
(ωt + ωt−1), (9.37)









Express the (9.37) in terms of µt:
µt =
(1 − λ1B)ut − (1 − λ1)c − 1
2 (ωt + ωt−1)
β (B)
, (9.39)
where β (B)=[ −(β1 + β2)+β2B].
Substitution of (9.39) into (9.38) leads to the short-run Phillips curve
(1 − λ1B)β (B)πt =( 1− λ1B)δ(B)ut − δ(B)(1− λ1)c
+
β (B)(ωt − ωt−2) − δ(B)(ωt + ωt−1)
2
, or
β (B)πt = δ(B)ut − δ1c +
β (B)(ωt − ωt−2) − δ(B)(ωt + ωt−1)
2(1− λ1B)
,
where δ(B)=[ ( δ1 + δ2)+( β2 − δ2)B − β2B2].









, and e ωt =
δ(B)(ωt + ωt−1) − β (B)(ωt − ωt−2)
2(β1 + β2)
.




































































Note that the above error term is a moving average process in terms of ωt, with parameters
which are non-linear functions of the theoretical parameters ψ, κ, and λ1.65
Express equation (9.40) as
πt = d0 + d1πt−1 − d2ut − d3ut−1 + d4ut−2 + et, (9.42)
where













Thus we have the following relationships among the d’s:
d4 = d1, and d3 = d2 − d1. (9.43)
Alternatively, (9.42) can be written as
(1 − λ1B)(1− d1B)πt = d0 (1 − λ1) − (1 − λ1B)
¡
d2 + d3B − d4B
2¢
ut + e ωt. (9.44)
Recall that both the autoregressive and moving average parameters in the above Phillips curve
equation are functions of the only two theoretical parameters α and γ. It is useful to have an
overall picture of all the relationships among the parameters of the above short-run PC:












































































The above equations make it clear that the restrictions we need to impose on the parameters of
the short-run PC (9.44) are highly complicated non-linear functions of the theoretical underlying
parameters α and γ. Therefore, (9.44) may not be estimable.
2.6: Long-Run Unemployment, Inﬂation, and the Phillips Curve
T og e tt h el o n g - r u ns o l u t i o no ft h eu n e m p l o y m e n te q u a t i o n( 9 . 3 4 )w es e tt h eb a c k s h i f t






65Recall that ψ, κ, and λ1 are non-linear functions of the theoretical parameters α and γ of the wage contract
equation.










t + c. (9.45)






















2.7: Short-Run vs Long-Run Phillips Curve








2(2α − 1) + γκ
, (9.48)









It can be shown that if the (absolute value of the) long-run slope is greater than unity then





¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ >
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
∂πt
∂ut
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯,
i.e. the long-run PC is steeper than the short run PC.66








2(2α − 1) + γκ
¶
c>0, (9.50)
66This can be shown as follows:





¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ >
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
∂πt
∂ut





2(2α − 1) + γκ
⇒
γ (2(2α − 1) + γκ) > (2α − 1)(γ + γκ) ⇒





(2α − 1) + γκ
.
Since the smallest value that α is assumed to take is one half, it follows that the maximum value of right-hand















¯ ¯ ¯ > 1.






Since both γ and κ are positive, it is not diﬃcult to see that the intercept of the long-run PC








2(2α − 1) + γκ
¶
c.
Appendix 3: OLS Estimates of the Unemployment,
Price, and Wage Equations
Table A2: Unemployment equation, OLS, 1966-2000.
Dependent variable: ut
coeﬃcient s.e. Misspeciﬁcation tests∗
ut−1 0.45 (0.14) SC[χ2 (1)] 1.51[0.22]
ut−2 −0.31 (0.13) LIN[χ2 (1)] 1.77[0.18]
mt −0.12 (0.04) NOR[χ2 (1)] 0.84[0.66]
ηt −0.14 (0.06) ARCH[χ2 (1)] 0.11[0.74]
∆kt −0.01 (0.002) HET[χ2 (16)] 13.9[0.61]
ot−1 0.01 (0.003) CUSUM X
ft −0.01 (0.005) CUSUMSQ X
ct 0.04 (0.02)
+ LL=137.77, AIC=-7.36, SC=-6.96
* Probabilities in square brackets
X Structural stability cannot be rejected at the 5% size of the test
+ Log likelihood (LL), Akaike (AIC) and Schwarz (SC) criteria
10Table A3: Price equation, OLS, 1966-2000.
Dependent variable: Pt
coeﬃcient s.e. Misspeciﬁcation tests∗
Pt−1 0.91 (0.20) SC[F (1,23)] 7.76[0.01]
Pt−2 −0.37 (0.13) LIN[χ2 (1)] 2.78[0.10]
Wt−1 0.32 (0.11) NOR[χ2 (2)] 0.01[0.99]
Mt 0.05 (0.03) ARCH[χ2 (1)] 0.00[0.99]
ut −0.65 (0.18) HET[χ2 (22)] 30.0[0.12]
θt −0.53 (0.14) CUSUM X




+ LL=141.63, AIC=-7.41, SC=-6.87
++ [F (1,23)] = 4.21[0.05]
* Probabilities in square brackets
X Structural stability cannot be rejected at the 5% size of the test
+ Log likelihood (LL), Akaike (AIC) and Schwarz (SC) criteria
++ Wald test for long-run no money illusion
Table A4: Wage equation, OLS, 1966-2000.
Dependent variable: Wt
coeﬃcient s. e. Misspeciﬁcation tests∗
Wt−1 0.19 (0.11) SC[χ2 (1)] 3.04[0.08]
∆Wt−2 0.47 (0.12) LIN[χ2 (1)] 1.10[0.29]
Pt 0.73 (0.12) NOR[χ2 (2)] 1.76[0.42]
Mt 0.08 (0.03) ARCH[χ2 (1)] 0.06[0.80]
ut −0.41 (0.21) HET[χ2 (14)] 15.1[0.37]
θt 0.35 (0.10) CUSUM X
bt 0.05 (0.02) CUSUMSQ X
+ LL=127.54, AIC=-6.83, SC=-6.48
++ [F (1,27)] = 0.07[0.80]
* Probabilities in square brackets
X Structural stability cannot be rejected at the 5% size of the test
+ Log likelihood (LL), Akaike (AIC) and Schwarz (SC) criteria
++ Wald test for long-run no money illusion































Appendix 5: Further Evidence on Whether the
Long-Run Phillips Curve is Vertical
In the following table we present the percentage count of slopes within speciﬁc class intervals.
For example, the probability that the long-run Phillips curve slope lies in the interval (−6,−1.5)
is 89%.
Table A5: probability that the PC slope
is within a speciﬁc interval
Slope interval (−∞,−6) (−6,−1.5) (−1.5,∞)
Probability 10.4 % 89.0 % 0.6 %
We also grouped the values of the generated series S(i),i=1 ,2,...,1000, into class intervals
of 0.5 units. Using as a cut-oﬀ point a 10% count, there is no class interval below [-4.5,-4.0) or
above [-2.5,-2.0) that contains at least 10% of the values of slope series S. These class intervals
and their respective probabilities are given in the table below.
Table A6: Monte Carlo simulations, 1000 replications
class intervals with a count above 10%
Slope interval [−4.5,−4.0) [−4.0,−3.5) [−3.5,−3.0) [−3.0,−2.5) [−2.5,−2.0)
Probability 11.1 % 14.3 % 18.0 % 12.8 % 11.9 %
12